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On Liberalism and Neutrality
ADRIANA PLACANI
Introductory Remarks
Central to liberalism is an emphasis on the individual seen as an autonomous 
being, characterized by individual freedom. I take individual freedom to be a com­
bination of two major claims -  freedom from coercion and moral self-determina­
tion. The former aspect will not be the subject of this essay as the scope of it does 
not include such considerations, while restrictions of this paper make it an almost 
prohibitive topic. My focus will be on the second aspect of the definition provided. 
Thus, the latter claim, namely moral self-determination, is based on a right to the 
pursuit of individual happiness. Given a pluralist vision of society the necessary 
condition that stems from achieving this aim under the liberal umbrella is a com­
mitment to neutrality between different conceptions of what happiness and the 
good life entail.
The discus sion of neutrality comes about when approaching the issue of plu­
ralism within societies. Neutrality is the liberal response to pluralism and the way 
in which liberals seek to reach agreement given the plurality and diversity of dif­
ferent conceptions of the good. For the most part I will discuss the conception of 
John Rawls of neutrality and public reason since his oeuvre has had an unques­
tionably profound influence on the work of many philosophers.
There are three questions that I am interested in pursuing. The first: does neu­
trality succeed in addressing the claims of minority groups? The second: within 
the Rawlsian framework, what constitutes as reasonable when it comes to compre­
hensive doctrines? The third: how can minorities make appeal to the public politi­
cal domain concerning matters that are specific to their culture and affect it directly 
and exclusively whilst maintaining the Rawlsian dichot omy of politi cal and com­
prehensive views?
I will argue that Rawls's vision of neutrality is in need of refinement if it wants 
to accommodate the specificity of claims for cultural recognition by minority 
groups. In the following I propose a concise but pertinent general discussion on 
lib er al ism and neutrality, followed by a criticism of John Rawls' seminal work in 
the realm of liberal theory, with a focus on neutrality as promoted by the author.
General Discussion
Throughout the course of this paper I shall make references to the case of minor­
ity groups and I believe that given the complexity of the concept a working defini­
tion is needed if this project is to be successful. For a proper definition of minority 
groups I will rely on probably the most influential vision, that of Will Kymlicka,
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who has made a vital contribution to minority rights theories and whose work has 
become essential reading for political scientists interested in the subject area.
According to the definition provided by Kymlicka a national minority is "a 
historical society, with its own language and institutions, whose territory has been 
incorporated (often involuntarily, as in the case with Quebec) into a larger country"1. 
The national minority could have achieved its status either involuntarily, through 
conquest, colonization, or expansion, or through a voluntary agreement of enter­
ing a federation with another or more nations or cultures.
Minorities' rights seem best protected by liberal theories that advocate for the 
primacy of toleration. However, liberalism is not without its vulnerabilities even 
from this pluralistic account of political thought. The most prevalent criticism of 
liberalism has been one that challenges precisely the idea that toleration should be 
given primacy. The argument goes as follows -  if toleration is the most valued con­
cept for liberals then tolerating non-toleration seems an impossible task. The main 
problem regards the interaction between liberal and non-liberal societies. Al­
though toleration for non-liberal societies seems an easy answer, the problem 
arises when considering the ever hot topic of human rights. This is the moment 
when liberal neutrality seems to lose its at first glance understandable appeal.
Much of the liberal foundation rests on the work of Immanuel Kant. The liber­
alism I choose to discuss is a deontological liberalism that has as core values jus­
tice, fairness and individual rights. For deontological liberalism justice is prior to 
all other moral or political ideals. The heart of this essay can be stated in the follow­
ing -  in a pluralist society, persons will have different goals, desires and concep­
tions of the good. This particular society will function best if it is ruled by principles 
which do not in themselves presuppose one conception of the good over another.
The primacy of justice as more than morals but the "determining ground" of 
moral law is best described by the words of Kant:
"The concept of good and evil is not defined prior to the moral law, 
to which, it would seem, the former would have to serve as foundation; 
rather the concept of good and evil must be defined after and by means of 
the law "2.
From the Kantian perspective, two conceptions follow: the right is prior to the 
good and justice is an end in itself.
Deontology opposes consequentialism from a moral sense -  certain categori­
cal duties and prohibitions stemming from a first-order ethic take unqualified 
precedence over other moral and practical matters. Also, deontology opposes tele­
ology from a foundational sense -  justification comes from principles that are inde­
pendent from human goals or ends or any conception of the good3.
The Kantian view stands in opposition to the kind of liberalism that John Stu­
art Mill purports. From Mill's utilitarian conception principles of justice are not 
prior, but there is the possibility that "some other social duty is so impor tant as to
1 Will KYMLICKA, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Toronto, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 2.
2 Immanuel KANT, The Critique o f Practical Reason, ed. and transl. L. White Beck, 3rd ed, 
Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993 p. 65.
3 Michael SANDEL, Liberalism and The Limits o f Justice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, p. 3.
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overrule any one of the general maxims of justice". This perception comes from 
Mill's belief in happiness as the ultimate end and desire of individuals1.
Kant's criticism of Mill stems from this very notion of happiness as the ulti­
mate goal of persons. He asserts that people will have diverse opinions about 
what happiness consists of and any attempt at making one specific concep tion of 
happiness the rule would be a violation of peoples' free dom. Ul ti mately, justice 
will suffer due to the coerciveness and unfair nature of such a concep tion:
"M en have different views on the empirical end of happiness and what 
it consists of, so that as far as happiness is concerned, their will cannot be 
brought under any common principle nor thus under any external law har­
monizing with the freedom of everyone"2.
The Kantian claim that the right is prior to the good is further completed by 
the notion that the subject is prior to its ends:
"It is nothing else than personality, i.e., the freedom and independence 
from the mechanisms of nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is 
sub ject to special laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason)"3.
John Rawls is, like Kant, a deontological liberalist and takes justice as the pri­
mary virtue:
"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought", he wrote. "A  theory however elegant and economical must be rejected 
or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient 
and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Being first 
virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising"4.
The change proposed by Rawls comes from a reformulation of the subj ect, 
which is in his case detached from "transcendental idealism" which was one of 
the major criticisms of Kant's work from an empiri cal percep tion.
Setting aside for now this subject matter, whether a Kantian metaphysical one 
or one based on more empirical grounds would be better suited for a theory of jus­
tice, it is important to note that this approach of liberalism with a contractarian 
sub-base is rooted not only in the work of John Rawls, but Brian Barry and Charles 
Larmore to name a few. Under the umbrella of pluralism and in a brief assessment 
these theorists propose that given different meanings and beliefs about the good 
and potential disagreement about the concept of good, the liberal approach for 
principles of justice is a neutral conception.
Moral disagreement entails some sort of an action by the state. There is an out­
lined taxonomy of possible responses, which granted, are in no way exhaustive, but 
are available to the state: institutional response, cultural response or avoidance5.
1 John Stuart MILL, Utilitarianism, Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1948, p. 469.
2 Immanuel KANT, Political Writings, transl. by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992, pp. 73-74.
3 IDEM, The Critique o f Practical Reason, 3rd ed, ed. and transl. L. White Beck, Maxwell 
Macmillan International, 1993 p. 65.
4 John RAWLS, A Theory o f Justice, Belknap Press, New York, 1971, pp. 3-4.
5 Simon CANEY, "Liberal Legitimacy, Reasonable Disagreement and Justice", in Richard 
BELLAMI, Martin HOLLIS (eds.), Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality, F. Cass Press, London, 1999, p. 20.
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Obviously the latter response is the one that liberals are mostly concerned with 
and the one I choose to discuss further. However, I will briefly go through the first 
two for clarification.
The insti tu tional response entails a procedural approach that requires the de­
sign of institutions for accommodating moral disagreement in order for all parties 
to be given respect and consideration so that the stability of the state doesn't suf­
fer. Examples of state action from this perspective range from conso cia tional ar­
rangements, federalization of the state up to the most severe -  secession, but 
regardless they all entail the institutional and procedural means of dealing with 
moral conflict in a fair style.
The second reaction of the state -  the cultural response entails a certain type 
of behavior that presupposes character traits akin to decency. Respect for the other 
party with whom there is disagreement requires a political dialogue free of con­
temptuous or insulting language1.
Finally, the liberal response promotes neutrality and gives preference to no 
vision of the good more so than another. Will Kymlicka presents neutrality as the 
view that
"the state should not reward or penalize particular conceptions of the good 
life but, rather, should provide a neutral framework within which different 
and potentially conflicting conceptions of the good can be pursued"2.
Brian Barry's Justice and Impartiality and Andrew Mason's, Explaining Political 
Disagreement make for good sources for drawing liberal principles that seem to be 
encompassing for liberal thought. The argument that both Barry and Mason make 
goes, in a nutshell, along these lines -  reasonable people have different concep­
tions of the good and since principles of justice should be justified to all reasonable 
people then principles of justice should refrain from passing judgments about dif­
ferent conceptions of the good and remain neutral.
From this particular vision two principles of liberal political thought emerge: 
P1: Principles of justice may only be based on a reasoning approach which cannot 
be reasonably rejected by anyone. P2: Reasonable persons do not necessarily agree 
in their estimation of the worth of different principles of the good. The conclusion 
of these two principles can be summed up in: C: Principles of justice should not be 
based upon assessments of the worth of different conceptions of the good3.
John Rawls's claims in Political Liberalism are similar to the two principles 
stated above. Further, Rawls asserts that principles of justice should be free-stand­
ing and he defends this claim by deferring to "reasonable pluralism" meaning 
that principles should be independent of controversies, be embedded in political 
culture and appeal to public reason. Charles Larmore and Brian Barry make simi­
lar claims, so the two principles above hold largely the same core position as they 
do for Rawls4. Further, the appeal to public reason will be the focus of my criticism 
of Rawls in the section to follow.
The above serves as an introductory look and the conceptual background 
which any discussion of liberal neutrality must entail. The discussion will become
1 Ibidem.
2 Will KYMLICKA, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality", Ethics, vol. 99, no. 4, 
July 1989, p. 883.
3 Simon CANEY, "Liberal Legitimacy.. .cit.", p. 21.
4 Ibidem.
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narrower in the sections to follow. I will attempt to show that the concept of neu­
trality is in need of refinement if it is to properly incorporate in its workings a plu­
ralistic view of society.
A Critique of Liberal Neutrality
Given the fact of pluralism, neutrality is a crucial feature of any liberal frame­
work. In the following I will focus on Rawls's conception of neutrality and public 
reason. Within the Rawlsian construction, pluralism is understood as a plurality 
of conceptions of the good. Neutrality aims to reconcile the consensus needed for 
the legitimacy of the state and moral disagreements about what constitutes a 
worthwhile life1. However, many authors have argued against the concept of neu­
trality and its implications in pluralist societies. For example, Derick van Heerden 
holds that applying neutral liberal principles in deeply pluralistic societies such as 
South Africa would result in the homogenization of culture. This is coupled with 
Van Heerden's claim that cultural uniformity of this sort leads to conflict if minori­
ties attempt to resist and demand protection of their particular cultures2.
Monique Deveaux in Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice pursues a line 
of argument similar to Van Heerden's. She questions whether Rawls's ideas re­
garding principles of justice are universal, particularly in pluralistic societies3. De- 
veaux holds that neutrality in political life combined with a stark division between 
public and private spheres creates social tensions in pluralistic societies. She won­
ders if a cultural minority group should be marginalized in politics simply be­
cause its public practices and political styles do not conform to the terms of neutral 
justification4. A large part of her argument focuses on Rawls's admission that liber­
alism can tend to marginalize particular groups whilst benefiting particular ways 
of life more than others. That being said, Rawls pursued the matter no further and 
completed his vision with an ungrounded statement:
"N o society can include within itself all forms of life. We may indeed 
lament the limited space, as it were, of social worlds [. . .] and we may regret 
some of the inevitable effects of our culture and social structure"5.
In spite of this weak defense, Rawls is an adamant proponent of neutrality. His 
advocacy rests on the claim that neutrality would be a principle that rational agents 
would choose under ideal circumstances. Rawls makes a case for what he calls the 
"overlapping consensus", which can be briefly stated as the means by which "a 
consensus of reasonable (as opposed to unreasonable or irrational) comprehensive 
doctrines" can be achieved. To reveal such a consensus, the conception of justice
1 John RAWLS, "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus", New York Uni­
versity Law Review, vol. 64, no. 2, 1989, pp. 233-255.
2 Derick VAN HEERDEN, "Liberal Neutrality and Cultural Pluralism", South African Journal 
o f Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, 1994, p. 97.
3 Monique DEVEAUX, Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas o f Justice, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 2000, p. 98.
4 Ibidem.
5 John RAWLS, "The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good“, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, vol. 17. no. 4, 1988, p. 265.
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that regulates society "should be, as far as possible, independent of the opposing 
and conflicting religious and philosophical doctrines that citizens affirm"1.
Such consensus is joined by a commitment to justifying the political princi­
ples of society to every individual: "Only a political conception of justice that all 
citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as basis of public rea­
son and justification"2. Underlying this conception of justice lays an appeal to the 
reasonableness of individuals. Two conceptions of neutrality follow. The two con­
ceptions are -  neutrality of aim and neutrality of procedure. The latter category 
refers to those procedures that must be justified without appeal to moral values, 
or in any case justified by appealing to neutral values such as impar ti al ity or equal­
ity of opportunity for persons presenting their claims3.
Rawls opts for the first category -  neutrality of aim. This is different from neu­
trality of procedure because at its core is a vision of insti tu tions and policies that 
are "neutral in the sense that they can be endorsed by citizens generally as within 
the scope of a public political conception"4. Neutrality of the public domain is the 
logi cal con se quence of neutrality of aim, which is in essence a way that reasonable 
pluralism can be accommodated. Rawls believes that justifying "reasonable, com­
prehensive doctrines" and accommodating the fact that justifications must be ad­
dressed to others, requires a basis of "shared, fundamental ideas implicit in the 
pub lic po liti cal cul ture"5.
Although Rawls does not offer many details, a shared public politi cal cul ture 
presupposes practical constraints aimed at achieving the neutrality of the public 
domain. Rawls finds such constraints a necessary component of his vision ofjus- 
tice as fairness in pluralist societies to work. It is impor tant to notice that when 
dis cuss ing the pub lic political realm, Rawls is very careful about making one 
clear division; namely, that "the public vs. nonpublic distinction is not the distinc­
tion between public and private". He avoids making this separation in public-pri­
vate terms because of the individualistic, non-associational connotations of the 
word "private". He maintains, "There is no such thing as private reason"6. Rawls 
settles on the term nonpublic because it best represents the various forms of asso­
ciation, often referred to as "social unions", without importing the connotations 
of "private".
This particular provision has been made by Rawls in order to address various 
criticisms, especially from supporters of feminism. In this regard, and after these 
newly added characteristics, family as well as all kinds of voluntary associations 
in civil society, such as clubs, churches, and universities were included7.
Rawls makes a crucial division between public and nonpublic "uses of rea­
son". The nonpub lic uses include the "social", the "familial", and the "individ- 
ual"8. In clear opposition to nonpublic reason, public reason is a normative ideal. 
The judiciary system, political officials, the executive branch, and also the citizens 
who "engage in political advocacy in the public forum" and vote on issues that
1 John RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, p. 9.
2 Ibidem, pp. 137-144.
3 Ibidem, p. 191.
4 John RAWLS, "The Priority of the Right.. .cit.", p. 262.
5 IDEM, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 100.
6 Ibidem, p. 220.
7 Ibidem, pp. 520-529.
8 Ibidem, p. 220.
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relate to "constitutional essentials and matters ofbasicjustice" are the main target 
of neutrality of the public domain.
More specifically, neutrality in the public sphere demands that moral, reli­
gious, philosophical views "are not in general to be introduced into politi cal dis­
cussion of constitutional essentials and the basic questions ofjustice"1. Determining 
whether views are comprehensive in the aforementioned ways is a test for wheth­
er they are to be a part of public reason (i.e., if they can justify political decisions 
and principles). The test is a device by which disagreement on moral issues may 
be addressed. However, moral diver sity be comes restricted un der a posi tion 
where certain comprehensive views are to be left out of the political (especially 
when considering that the relation between them can be fairly direct).
For the case of national minorities specifically, the constraints of neutrality in 
the political domain can be to the detriment of minority groups claiming recogni­
tion of their culture. With its stark division between non-political and politi cal 
spheres, and with the clausal constraint that political views cannot originate from 
deeply rooted religious beliefs, the test of public reason can prove to be insur­
mountable. One must consider here what is at stake. Since the stakes are very high 
for minorities when it comes to the recognition of their cultures, making appeal to 
more than what is held to be common shared fundamental ideas does not seem to 
be an exaggerated claim. In theory, liberalism supports the diversity of distinct 
ways of life but frowns upon allowing minorities to express their claims for recog­
nition in ways that reflect their beliefs and their own style of deliberation.
The rationale that underlies the liberal position described above is the com­
mitment to a policy of avoidance discussed in a previous section as one possibility 
of state action. In this case those that must be avoided are political arguments, 
which have the potential of leading to confrontation and disagreement. However, 
is this not in fact a disservice or more drastically a severe limitation to democratic 
procedures? I will comment more on this issue later in this paper.
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that on the issue of disallowing comprehensive 
views in the political sphere, Rawls did make some revisions later on in Political 
Liberalism. In an attempt at answering criticism, he allows for reasonable compre- 
hen sive doc trines to
"be introduced into public reason at any time, provided that in due course 
public reasons, given by a reasonable political conception are presented suf­
ficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to 
sup port"2.
This is not a major accommodation for minorities inasmuch as reasonable 
comprehensive views are those in tune with the public reason. Nevertheless, there 
is a persistent question regarding how to determine what is a reasonable compre­
hensive view, and how this is to be decided prior to reaching agreement.
Two matters are unclear at this point under the liberal framework. Firstly, de­
termining what is reasonable when it comes to comprehensive doctrines. Sec­
ondly, how can minorities make appeal to the public political domain concerning 
matters specific to their culture and affect it directly and exclusively? I will pro­
ceed in discussing these two aspects of liberal neutrality in the following.
1 John RAWLS, Political Liberalism, cit., pp. 215-216.
2 Ibidem, "Introduction".
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The concept of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is based on the assump­
tion that "citizens have two views, a comprehensive and a political view". It is, at 
least for me, very difficult to imagine how people with very strong religious or 
moral beliefs could even be able to make this distinction. The two concepts seem 
intimately tied. The allowance of comprehensive views requires of people the use 
of a specific language and an appeal to widely believed set of norms and convic­
tions if it is to enter the political domain and fulfill the conditions of reasonable­
ness. The general aim is the reach of consensus and agreement between different 
views about the good but lies on the assumption that people will firstly agree on 
the standards of liberal neutrality. The sacrifices of meeting the conditions im­
posed by the concept of neutrality seems to tip the balance of power in favor of 
those whose beliefs are either widely spread or completely absent.
This can arguably be seen as some sort of a "punishment" for either believing 
in something else, or believing in different norms than the maj ority in soci ety. 
However, this perspective runs counter to any claims of commitment to a diver­
sity of beliefs which liberals allegedly profess. Some may say that the sacrifice 
neutrality requires isn't very great but if that sacrifice is required only from a spe­
cific group then the outlook changes. Further, in all likelihood the group in ques­
tion may already be faced with battling discriminating behaviors. Therefore, it is 
not unreasonable to deduce that the system perpetuates the kind of discrimina­
tion that purportedly it should be fighting against.
For the sake of the argument let's imagine that for decades a group of people 
was prohibited from practicing its religious beliefs. The group may be allowed to do 
so now, although the very usage of the term of allowance or toleration seems to me 
quite derisive and filled with negative connotations, but it requires an alteration of 
their claims so as to meet the general view on religion. Under this scenario the conse­
quences of following the liberal conditions so as to maintain neutrality may have 
consequences that distort the perspectives of the minority group. This distortion 
seems in need of justification. However, the justification is not required from the 
part of those who impose the norms; in fact quite the opposite of that is true.
The reason for this situation follows the same rationale that liberals appeal to 
when they try to justify their reliance on shared sets of beliefs (i.e. a preliminary 
agreement between individuals), namely for the sake of reaching a general consen­
sus. However, fear of disagreement, controversy, debate, and argumentative 
stands may have the negative effect of transforming the political scene into a force 
of oppression, and without trying to sound too drastic, basically a chopping board 
for what Rawls calls comprehensive views. In turn, this may potentially lead to ei­
ther political apathy among the minority groups in question or a sense of being 
wronged once more.
For liberals such as Rawls some views are either not fit to enter political debate 
or they have been settled upon and thus have no place on the deliberative political 
scene. Rawls provides an example in support of this claim, which leaves outside of 
the public arena certain subject matters -  his example is slavery. However, it is use­
ful to remember that at one historical moment slavery was considered a relevant 
topic on the political agenda. In fact, Michael Sandel uses the same example in or­
der to counter the minimalist liberal argument asserting that the neutrality of the 
state not only benefits but is a necessity if social cooperation is to be achieved.
Sandel's argument stems from the interpretation of John Rawls's theory ofpoliti- 
cal liberalism as in line with the minimalist argument. He comes to the conclu sion
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that from a Rawlsian viewpoint in a plural society people's moral and religious 
be liefs differ, therefore the reasonable way of reaching agreement is from a neutral 
framework of principles of justice.
Sandel uses the debate between Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln on 
slavery as an example of a situation where moral views outweigh such consid era- 
tions as social cooperation. Furthermore, Lincoln's opposition to slavery contained 
substantive moral judgment. Sandel is arguing, for example, that Lincoln's politi­
cal stand against slavery developed from a moral and religious position. Lincoln's 
argument stemmed from the belief that slavery is violating God's purposes of 
making all men equal. Further, Lincoln's arguments sustained that the govern­
ment should treat slavery as a moral wrong and proscribe its expansion. Hence, 
Sandel presents a case, in fact the same as Rawls, where a comprehensive concep­
tion was appropriately used within a political debate in order to oppose slavery1.
On this note, Sandel describes Rawls's vision of liberal toleration as "non-judg- 
mental" and argues against it in favor of judgmental toleration2. In Sandel's view, 
non-judgmental toleration allows different practices without considering the mor­
al value of the practice. According to Sandel, Rawls's theory of justice presents a 
good example of this notion of toleration because Rawls argues that principles of 
justice should not be justified in terms of any particular substantive moral or reli­
gious viewpoint.
Michael Sandel disagrees with two arguments of liberal toleration, one being 
the minimal argument presented above and the other the voluntarist argument. 
According to the voluntarist claim, the law should be neutral among substantive 
moral and religious views in order to respect persons as free and independent 
selves, capable of choosing their ends for themselves3. Sandel argues that volunta­
rism doesn't achieve a high level of toleration inasmuch as its aims are not geared 
towards weakening or even challenging the public perception on different prac­
tices that are tolerated. The objection to the voluntarist argument has two compo­
nents. To begin with, the first objection states roughly that the voluntarist principle 
entails the right to autonomy and the appeal to autonomy is insuffi cient in main­
taining social cooperation without some agreement on the moral permissibility of 
the practice to be tolerated. Moreover, Sandel believes that the voluntarist argu­
ment can only deliver a very weak form of toleration, inasmuch as it does not seek 
to undermine the unfavorable view of the practices tolerated.
The example he provides the reader with is that of homosexual relationships. 
Within the liberal framework, homosexual practices are protected but not on the 
grounds that they achieve some human good, but because they articulate the pref­
erence of autonomous persons. This fine distinction has substantial consequences 
inasmuch as it leads to a form of weak toleration. Furthermore, Sandel points out 
that arguments stemming from comprehensive religious or moral conceptions 
should be used in political debates because it would be detrimental for all partici­
pating parties not to do so. As a consequence, the Rawlsian formulation of public 
reason is damaging overall because it prohibits arguments in favor of the moral 
validation of homosexuality and viewpoints that oppose such arguments.
1 Michael SANDEL, Liberalism.. .cit., p. 200.
2 IDEM, "Judgmental Toleration", in Robert GEORGE (ed.), Natural Law, Liberalism, and 
Morality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 107-112.
3 IDEM, "Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy", Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 49, no. 5, May 1997, pp. 1271-1291.
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The two examples used by Sandel are very compelling and Rawls has made 
some alterations to his original viewpoint in order to answer these types of possi­
ble objections. However, to what degree he was successful is at best unclear. In The 
Lim its of Public Reason, Rawls distinguishes within his conception of public reason 
between an exclusive and an inclusive view. The exclusive view prohibits the intro­
duction within public reason of arguments that rely on comprehensive doctrines. 
The inclusive view allows for introducing comprehensive doctrines within the po­
litical so long as they are used to reinforce the very idea of the public reason itself. 
Further, Rawls claims that:
"Under different political and social conditions with different families 
of doctrine and practice, the ideal must surely be advanced and fulfilled in 
different ways, sometimes by what may look as the exclusive view, at others 
by what may look like the inclusive view "1.
The provisions made by Rawls so as to further the advancement of compre­
hensive views as political values are insufficient inasmuch as they only amount to 
an in stru men tali za tion of comprehensive beliefs to further the ideal of public rea­
son. The actual value, moral worth and most importantly the role that they might 
play in political debates remains unad dressed.
For the specific situation of national minorities this point is crucial. Without 
making appeal to comprehensive views, arguments for cultural recognition would 
be stripped out of most of their substantive content (i.e., out of the particularity of 
minority claims and of the reasons that justify them). The liberal rationale, which 
underlies Rawls's claims, is that the ideal of public reason aims at creating a com­
mon ground and a universalizing and justificatory scheme of political debate. 
Further, by limiting itself to values that are exclusively political, the theory pro­
vides a satisfactory foundation of legitimization for citizens in pluralist societies. 
But, how limiting are the limitations of public reason and neutrality?
For the case of national minorities the answer differs on a case-by-case basis 
but it can result in negative consequences by exercising a limiting force on the pool 
of reasons and justificatory mechanisms that the minorities have access to. More­
over, the limitations put forth under the framework of public reason and neutral­
ity can result in obstructing channels of communication between minorities and 
the general public, namely society at large. Further, separation from comprehen­
sive views may result in two extremes: either alienation from the political life for 
those minorities who find their views to be deemed unfit for public debate, a pos­
sibility which explains the political apathy of many minority groups, or extreme 
frustration with the political realm which can lead to conflict or protest.
The appeal to public reason requires a consid era tion of justi fi ca tions that all 
individuals might accept. However, this is not the same as considering what each 
individual might accept. Further, although the goal is to reach consensus based on 
shared, com mon be liefs the commonality of the beliefs that liberals appeal to is 
not outside of being questionable. For instance, the liberal rationale of separating 
the political from the comprehensive may not be aimed at removing all contro­
versy from the public political sphere, but at securing basic liberties.
However, Rawls doesn't seem to consider that many such basic liberties, 
which he consid ers as settled, are in fact highly controversial -  freedom of speech
1 John RAWLS, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 248.
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is a good example with debates about pornography and defamatory language still 
being at the root of much deliberation and disagreement1. Thus, the universality 
of Rawls's concep tion is challenged to the extent that his assumptions concerning 
individuals' shared vision of basic liberties is less than homogenous.
The principle of neutrality may cause tensioned relations amongst people 
with strong cultural views or religious beliefs because of the stark division be­
tween the public and the private that neutrality entails2. In the context of political 
debates the purposefulness of avoiding "private" issues in order to avoid antago­
nism might have precisely that effect. This is especially true for national or ethnic 
minorities trying to make claims regarding the recognition of their culture and / or 
religion. Further, it is unclear why views that are not unreasonable (I doubt that 
there would be voices saying that all views which differ from that of the majority 
are unreasonable or dangerous) would have to necessarily be avoided or ignored 
within political debates. For example, if the difference between the minority group 
and the majority lies in a dissimi lar ity of political styles or public practices then 
the liberal justification for marginalizing those groups seems to be at a loss for ex- 
planations3 To put it more simply -  the liberal "punishment" doesn't seem to fit 
the "crime" of the minorities' claims -  and there is no crime to begin with.
Rawls admits to the fact that liberalism might marginalize some groups while 
advantaging others but firstly he doesn't treat the problem with much consid era- 
tion and secondly he claims that any advantage or disadvantage is incidental. It is 
strange for a theory that claims to profess a commitment of securing justice for all 
and every individual to leave concerns for national, ethnic, cultural or religious 
minorities at the margins, while encouraging other or prevalent ways of life4. In 
this regard Rawls writes:
"The principles of any reasonable political conceptions must impose 
restrictions on permissible comprehensive views and the basic institutions 
those principles require inevitably encourage some ways of life and discour­
age others, or even exclude them altogether [...] Now, the encouraging or 
dis cour ag ing of comprehensive doctrines comes about in at least two ways: 
those doctrines may be in direct conflict with the principles of justice; or else 
they may be admissible but fail to gain adherents under the political and so­
cial conditions of a just constitutional regime [...] Examples of the second 
case may be certain forms of religion"5.
A possible solution or at least a refinement of this liberal theory would seek to 
incorporate the moral and political concerns of citizens and thus achieve a higher 
level of attunement with people's actual sentiments and beliefs. In line with this 
argument lies the theory proposed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
who argue for more moral disagreement in politics than liberals allow at present6. 
They propose so-called "principles of accommodation" as opposed to "principles
1 Monique DEVEAUX, Cultural Pluralism.. .cit., p. 98.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, pp. 99-100.
5 John RAWLS, "The Priority of the Right.. .cit.", pp. 264-265.
6 Amy GUTMANN, Dennis THOMPSON, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, Ethics, vol. 101, 
issue 1, October 1990, pp. 64-65.
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of preclusion" that would allow for the institutionalization of more diverse con­
ceptions, viewpoints, and political styles. As a result these principles of accommo­
dation would allow for the inclusion of a greater range of cultural communities1.
An interesting point raised by Monique Deveaux questions the way in which 
people come into politics. She argues that sometimes citizens may enter the realm 
of politics precisely as representatives of cultural, gender, linguistic or ethnic 
groups rather than as individuals supporting neutrally justified policies. If the aim 
of these individuals is to counter politics of marginalization of the group they are 
members of then their less than neutral position should be justifiable. However, 
this is not the case within liberal politics centered on the principle of neutral ity.
Minorities may be granted a formal inclusion through constitutional means 
but associating that formal inclusion with the public blindness that neutrality 
and the idea of public reason purports makes the actual inclusion of national mi­
norities a far away concept. This follows Amartya Sen's definition of inclusion as 
both a capability and an acquisition, meaning it is not enough to have a right to 
legal rights but also the capability of making use of those rights as opportunities 
and resources2. Granting a national minority status with the rights associated is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition. Further, asking from the part of the na­
tional minority group to set aside more comprehensive views is a requirement 
that not only is hard to justify for the reasons presented above but also it is very 
difficult. Much of the groups' identity is strongly connected with these views and 
they cannot be dismissed easily.
Furthermore, and on a more general note, having to keep what is an essential 
part of a persons' identity aside from the public arena seems to perpetu ate the kind 
of discrimination that minorities have suffered from throughout history. It is per­
petuating the feeling that one should hide their true beliefs and concep tions about 
what it means to lead a worthy life. It adds insult to injury inasmuch as many minor­
ity groups have experienced years of oppression and discrimination. It harms peo­
ple by requiring them to hide their true beliefs and thus creating a feeling of having 
to feel ashamed and of being humiliated. Finally, stripping away from the individ­
ual his or her status of a member within a minority group reinforces the feeling of 
being discriminating against since much of a groups' history of discrimination has 
precisely nothing to do with the individual as such but with him or her being a part 
of that minority. And yet, formal inclusion is based solely on individual rights.
Granted, I do not mean to say that this is the case for all national minorities; 
rather I am simply suggesting that there are groups which either fit into the above 
de scrip tion from an empirical standpoint or theoretically a situation fitting these 
profile may hypothetically be constructed. What can be said with more precision 
is that Rawls doesn't seek to make incorporate or explicitly include minorities into 
political life nor does he support a deliberative approach of accommodating differ­
ences stemming from comprehensive views, whether be religious, moral or cul­
tural, within politics which is important for properly addressing pluralism3.
Further, by adopting this view, Rawls becomes an advocate for the status quo 
which is meant in this case as supporting those values which have already been
1 Monique DEVEAUX, Cultural Pluralism.. .cit., p. 105.
2 Amartya SEN, "Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures: 1984", Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 82, no. 4, 1985, p. 199.
3 Monique DEVEAUX, Cultural Pluralism.. .cit., p. 105.
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deemed as "fitting" or have already been chosen by the large public. This in turn 
has the effect of an extrapolation of the idea of public blindness to blindness to­
wards other means of addressing issues on the political agenda or the possibility 
of choosing different inputs for debating so that different outcomes may result as 
possible solutions for reaching agreement. Thus, a limitation of both inputs and 
outcomes can be experienced by following Rawlsian lines which is neither for the 
benefit of the minority groups nor the majority within pluralist societies.
The criticism of neutrality that I proposed does in no way suggest that the 
principle of neutrality should not be used as a feature of politi cal de lib era tion, 
rather that its core position inside liberal political debates should be polished so as 
to provide for an accommodation of the needs of national minorities groups. Fur­
ther, although it may be argued that neutrality is a necessary condition for the ad­
vancement of consensus among different conceptions of the good it is not a 
sufficient condition, especially when considering the case of minority groups.
Concluding Remarks
Although unsure about the success of my argument I am at least sure about 
opening a line of discussion and possible assessment of some of liberalism's pro­
fessed commitments. The concluding remarks of this essay follow the link between 
neutrality and the situation of minority groups. Inasmuch as liberal political theory 
professes to protect peoples' rights generally and minorities specifically, it might 
seem to be fertile ground for addressing minority claims. However, neutrality is vul­
nerable to many obj ections particularly from the standpoint of claims of cultural 
recognition by minority groups. Further, an important aspect of politics of neutral­
ity -  political deliberation -  seems limited under Rawls's framework and especially 
under his concept of public reason. Regarding this aspect, the Rawlsian theory is in 
need of change if it is to incorporate the particular needs of minority groups.
Thus, I tried to illustrate that liberal neutrality may not be the best suited model 
to provide the proper framework in accommodating the needs of minority groups. 
The conclusion stemming from this served the purpose of challenging the legiti­
macy of the liberal state by assessing liberalism from the perspective of minority 
groups. It is from this vantage point, a minority one that the dominance and popular­
ity of liberalism must continue to be confronted if freedom for all is to be attained.
The above serves as the starting point of a research project aimed at discover­
ing and examining the potential conflicts which arise within political theory, and 
more pertinently within liberal theory with regards to minority rights issues.
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